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Theoretically any share gives its propriator two kinds of rights: financial rights and corporate 
rights. The first group emcompasses: the right to dividend, the right to a part of the resident 
value in a case of liquidation, the right to sell a share and get an acceptable price for it and so 
on. The second group consist of quite different privileges: the right to call and take part in 
shareholders’ meetings, right to elect board members, the right to amend a corporate charter, the 
right to decide about key aspects of the corporate activity. While all finacial rights are separate 
(that means any shareholder can exercise them without – generally – cooperating with others 
and without – generally – harming others), excersising of corporate rights sometimes requires 
some cooperation of other shareholders or – more precisly – taking into account the corporate 
rights of others. 
All the benefits identified with corporate rights assigned to the controlling person(s) 
encompass knowledge, prestige, control over expenditures of the company and similar gains the 
controlling person(s) can obtain. A person or a group of persons can excersise the controlling 
power completely excluding from it other shareholders (sometimes this group of benefits is 
called private benefits [3]). Moreover, the controlling party can influence financial performance 
of the company and thus harm financial rights of other shareholders. Corporate rights as 
anything that gives benefits can be priced. Some scholars investigate dual–class companies 
valuation [4, 5], others use different methods, for example linked with shark repellents effects 
on the market value of a company [2]. In this paper I assume that in different ownership 
structures a single transaction of the same numbers of shares affects different changes in 
shareholders’ corporate rights. 
In publicly traded companies the price of a single share reflects both rights transferred from a 
seller to a purchaser. The finacial rights can be measured by several ratios and indicators (ROE, 
P/E ratio, P/BV ratio, and others).  The corporate rights are more complex… 
Let’s consider the situation of a single shareholder A having 10 of 100 shares (that means 
10% of voting rights) of a company.  In the situation of the lack specific charter regulations he 
has the right to 10% of the whole dividend, the right to 10% of the resident value and the right 
to 10% of a sum that an acquirer is ready to pay for a company. It doesn’t mean, however, he 
has 10% of controlling power over a company. Actually, he can have 10% of this power, much 
more of it or much less of it. It depends of the structure of company’s ownership [1]. To 
illustrate the difference of a single shareholder’s position in general shareholders’ meeting let’s 
introduce the concept of Shapley–Shubik Power Index (hereafter: SSPI). The basic assumptions 
of SSPI are: 
 the decision–making group consists of n persons (A, B, C, … n); 
 each person can have different number of votes; 







 the coalition that doesn’t have enough votes to make a decision is called the losing 
coalition; the coalition that have enough votes to make a decision is called the winning 
coalition; 
 coalitions are created by joining another and another person; the coalition {A,B} is 
different than the coalition {B,A}; 
 each coalition encompassing all voters has the same probability of existing; 
 person who by joining to the losing coalition turn it into the winning coalition is called 
the pivot voter (P); 
 there are n! possible joining sequences; 
 the Shapley–Shubik Power Index of person i is calculated by dividing the number of 
coalitions in which person i is the pivot voter by the number of possible coalitions 
encompassing all voters (n!). 
Probably the most illustrative example of SSPI is a 3–persons decision–making group in 
which members (A, B, and C) have respectively: 49%, 48% and 3% of votes, and in which a 
decision needs more than 50% of all votes to be made (all important informations concerning 
the group can be presented as: {51;49,48,3}). The distribution of voting rights in the described 
group is deeply unequal, but all members have the same power in a decision–making process: 
none of them can make a decision alone and must convince at least one of two others. It means 
any 2–person coalition is a winning coalition and it leads us to a conclusion that all group 
members have the same possibility to be a pivot voter and thus the same power to influence the 
decision. 
As we can see the shareholder’s position in a shareholders meeting depends not only on the 
number of shares he possesses, but also on the shareholder structure. The same 3% of shares 
held by shareholder C gives no power to decide if any other shareholder possesses 51% of 
votes. 
Generally, by selling a share a shareholder transfers both rights to a buyer. But it’s obvious 
that not in all cases the same part of control power is transferred to a purchaser. For example, in 
the structure of three shareholders described above {51;49,48,3} a single transaction on 1% of 
outstanding shares does not change a position of any shareholder no matter which pair of them 
would be engaged in this transaction. In other ownership structures a similar transaction can 
change power of not only engaged parties, but also other group members. To see how deeply 
one transaction between two shareholders can change the power distribution among all owners 
consider a 10–member ownership structure company with equal participation (10 shares) of all 
shareholders: {51; 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10} and other 10–member ownership 
structures. 
In the first structure of {51; 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10} a single transaction 
concerning one share will change SSPI of both engaged parties: position of a buyer (say 
shareholder A) substantially rises; the position of a seller (say: shareholder J) will decrease. All 
other shareholders will keep initial power. It’s illustrated in table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Shapley–Shubik Power Index distribution in equal shares possesion {51; 10, 10, 
10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10} and after a single transaction concerning one share 
 
Shareholder SSPI (basic) SSPI after selling one share from J to A 
A 10% 15,56% 
B 10% 10% 
C 10% 10% 
D 10% 10% 
E 10% 10% 
F 10% 10% 
G 10% 10% 
H 10% 10% 
I 10% 10% 







As we can see in the described situation by buing 1% of voting rights shareholder A bought 
over 5% of power and shareholder J by selling one share resigned from over 5% of control 
power. Both shareholders engaged in this transaction changed their control power in total by 
11,11% (5,55%+5,55%) of overall control over a company. Shareholders not engaged in this 
transaction saved their control posisions unchanged. 
In more complex structures of ownership a single transaction can change control power of 
even non–engaged shareholders. Thus, we can calculate total change of control power of 
engaged parties and overall change separately. Let’s compare two ownership structures with the 
same number of sareholders (10) and total number of shares (100), and the same majority rule 
(51 votes). The structures are: {51; 25, 20, 15, 10, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5} and {51; 40, 25, 15, 10, 5, 1, 
1, 1, 1, 1}. 
In two tables below (2 and 3) in „the cross sell” defined by a single seller and buyer there are 
two numbers: the top one describes the total change of control power of both engaged parties of 
a transaction; the bottom one – the total change of all shareholders’ power. 
 
Table 2 – Shapley–Shubik Power Index distribution changes after a single share transaction 
of: {51; 25, 20, 15, 10, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5}  
 
  Buyer 



























































































































































































If we compare changes that a single–share transaction can cause in different ownership 
structures, we can see that the more equal the SSPI distribution is, the more control power is 
transferred in a single transaction. Of course, some specific transactions presented in table 3 
cause deeper changes in all overall control power than the corresponding transaction presented 
in table 2 (e.g. when shareholder D sells a share to any shareholder except A), but in all other 
situations a one–share transaction in a more equal structure causes deeper changes in 
shareholders power. Can we expect this difference will be observed in quotations of companies 









Table 3 – Shapley–Shubik Power Index distribution changes after a single share transaction 
of: {51; 40, 25, 15, 10, 5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1} 
 
  Buyer 



























































































































































































Of course we can expect so, but some constraints limit the ability to effectively measure 
these differences. Some regulations concerning stock exchange rules (e.g. tender offer 
restrictions or charter limitations of turnover) as well as charter regulations on board members 
election can affect the shareholder’s ability to sell real control assigned to a share. 
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